13. Impious conceptions of the divine nature in popular religions of both kinds

The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious
fear of future events; and what ideas will naturally be entertained
of invisible, unknown powers, while men lie under dismal
apprehensions of any kind, may easily be conceived. Every image of
vengeance, severity, cruelty, and malice must occur, and must
augment the ghastliness and horror, which oppresses the amazed
religionist. A panic having once seized the mind, the active fancy
still farther multiplies the objects of terror; while that profound
darkness, or, what is worse, that glimmering light, with which we
are environed, represents the spectres of divinity under the most
dreadful appearances imaginable. And no idea of perverse wickedness
can be framed, which those terrified devotees do not readily,
without scruple, apply to their deity.

This appears the natural state of religion, when surveyed in
one light. But if we consider, on the other hand, that spirit of
praise and eulogy, which necessarily has place in all religions, and
which is the consequence of these very terrors, we must expect a
quite contrary system of theology to prevail. Every virtue, every
excellence, must be ascribed to the divinity, and no exaggeration
will be deemed sufficient to reach those perfections, with which he
is endowed. Whatever strains of panegyric can be invented, are
immediately embrace, without consulting any arguments or phaenomena:
It is esteemed a sufficient confirmation of them, that they give us
more magnificent ideas of the divine objects of our worship and
adoration.

Here therefore is a kind of contradiction between the different
principles of human nature, which enter into religion. Our natural
terrors present the notion of a devilish and malicious deity: Our
propensity to adulation leads us to acknowledge an excellent and
divine. And the influence of these opposite principles are various,
according to the different situation of the human understanding.

In very barbarous and ignorant nations, such as the A/FRICANS\
and I/NDIANS\, nay even the J/APONESE\, who can form no extensive
ideas of power and knowledge, worship may be paid to a being, whom
they confess to be wicked and detestable; though they may be
cautious, perhaps, of pronouncing this judgment of him in public, or
in his temple, where he may be supposed to hear their reproaches.

Such rude, imperfect ideas of the Divinity adhere long to all
idolaters; and it may safely be affirmed, that the G/REEKS\
themselves never got entirely rid of them. It is remarked by
X/ENOPHON\,[87] in praise of S/OCRATES\, that this philosopher
assented not to the vulgar opinion, which supposed the gods to know
some things, and be ignorant of others: He maintained, that they
knew every thing; what was done, said, or even thought. But as this
was a strain of philosophy[88] much above the conception of his
countrymen, we need not be surprised, if very frankly, in their
books and conversation, they blamed the deities, whom they
worshipped in their temples. It is observable, that H/ERODOTUS\ in
particular scruples not, in many passages, to ascribe to the
gods; a sentiment, of all others, the most suitable to a mean and
devilish nature. The pagan hymns, however, sung in public worship,
contained nothing but epithets of praise; even while the actions
ascribed to the gods were the most barbarous and detestable. When
T/IMOTHEUS\, the poet, recited a hymn to D/IANA\, in which he
enumerated, with the greatest eulogies, all the actions and
attributes of that cruel, capricious goddess: ,
said one present, .[89]

But as men farther exalt their idea of their divinity; it is
their notion of his power and knowledge only, not of his goodness,
which is improved. On the contrary, in proportion to the supposed
extent of his science and authority, their terrors naturally
augment; while they believe, that no secrecy can conceal them from
his scrutiny, and that even the inmost recesses of their breast lie
open before him. They must then be careful not to form expressly any
sentiment of blame and disapprobation. All must be applause,
ravishment, extacy. And while their gloomy apprehensions make them
ascribe to him measures of conduct, which, in human creatures, would
be highly blamed, they must still affect to praise and admire that
conduct in the object of their devotional addresses. Thus it may
safely be affirmed, that popular religions are really, in the
conception of their more vulgar votaries, a species of daemonism;
and the higher the deity is exalted in power and knowledge, the
lower of course is he depressed in goodness and benevolence;
whatever epithets of praise may be bestowed on him by his amazed
adorers. Among idolaters, the words may be false, and belie the
secret opinion: But among more exalted religionists, the opinion
itself contracts a kind of falsehood, and belies the inward
sentiment. The heart secretly defects such measures of cruel and
implacable vengeance; but the judgment dares not but pronounce them
perfect and adorable. And the additional misery of this inward
struggle aggravates all the other terrors, by which these unhappy
victims to superstition are for ever haunted.

L/UCIAN\[90] observes that a young man, who reads the history
of the gods in H/OMER\ or H/ESIOD\, and finds their factions, wars,
injustice, incest, adultery, and other immoralities so highly
celebrated, is much surprised afterwards, when he comes into the
world, to observe that punishments are by law inflicted on the same
actions, which he had been taught to ascribe to superior beings. The
contradiction is still perhaps stronger between the representations
given us by some later religions and our natural ideas of
generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice; and in proportion to
the multiplied terrors of these religions, the barbarous conceptions
of the divinity are multiplied upon us.[91] Nothing can preserve
untainted the genuine principles of morals in our judgment of human
conduct, but the absolute necessity of these principles to the
existence of society. If common conception can indulge princes in a
system of ethics, somewhat different from that which should regulate
private persons; how much more those superior beings, whose
attributes, views, and nature are so totally unknown to us? superis sua jura>.[92] The gods have maxims of justice peculiar to
themselves.




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